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Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), or synchrophasors, are rapidly being deployed in
the smart grid with the goal of measuring phasor quantities concurrently from wide area
distribution substations. By utilizing GPS receivers, PMUs can take a wide area snapshot
of power systems. Thus, the possibility of blackouts in the smart grid, the next generation
power grid, will be reduced. As the main enabler of Wide Area Measurement Systems
(WAMS), PMUs transmit measured values to Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) by the
synchrophasor standard IEEE C37.118. IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 are the communication
protocols for the substation automation system and the security standard for the
communication protocol of IEC 61850, respectively. According to the aforementioned
communication and security protocols, as well as the implementation constraints of
different platforms, HMAC-SHA1 was suggested by the TC 57 WG group in October
2009. The hash-based Message Authentication Code (MAC) is an algorithm for verifying
both message integrity and authentication by using an iterative hash function and a supplied
secret key.

There are a variety of security attacks on the PMU communications infrastructure.
Timing Side Channel Attack (SCA) is one of these possible attacks. In this thesis, timing
side channel vulnerability against execution time of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication
algorithm is studied. Both linear and negative binomial regression are used to model some
security features of the stored key, e.g., its length and Hamming weight. The goal is to
reveal secret-related information based on leakage models. The results would mitigate the
cryptanalysis process of an attacker.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

In this thesis, the security of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) in smart grid
communication infrastructures is analyzed. An outline of subsequent chapters and their
objectives are indicated below.
Related backgrounds are mainly discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter includes a brief
introduction of the smart grid, including measurement and monitoring tools, as well as its
features and benefits compared with the traditional power grid. IEEE C37.118, as a
synchrophasor protocol utilized in current PMUs, will be discussed, along with the
transmitting packet format and payload structure. The network architecture of the
synchrophasor and the Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) of the entire smart grid,
as well as their communication infrastructures, are presented. In this context, WAMS is
specifically known as a real-time performance system. Moreover, IEC 61850 and IEC
62351, as a substation automation system communication protocol and a security standard
for the IEC 61850 communication protocol, respectively, will be discussed. Since this
thesis is focused on PMUs from a security perspective, the security requirements and
related performance concerns in smart grid communication infrastructure will be
discussed. Considering the implementation constraints and 4 millisecond response time in
IEC 61850, HMAC-SHA1 is recommended as the authentication algorithm verifying both
integrity and authentication of PMU measurements in substation communication
infrastructure.
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A literature review of previous work in the security of PMU communication
infrastructure, as well as corresponding solutions, is briefly presented in Chapter 3. The
importance of several security objectives, e.g., availability and authentication, which affect
the real time and wide area monitoring of the entire smart grid, is discussed.
Reconnaissance, packet injection, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are introduced.
Time synchronization attacks, mostly classified as GPS spoofing, GPS blocking, and GPS
jamming, are discussed due to the importance of accuracy in timing information. In
addition, PHY layer attacks such as jamming, eavesdropping, and restricting access attacks
are pointed out. For instance, eavesdropping on the IEEE C37.118 network traffic reveals
the IP of the PMU location. The encryption algorithm and other cyber security measures
such as IPSEC and SSL are some of the recommended countermeasures to the above
attacks.
After presenting an overview of PMU security, Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) on PMUs
are introduced in Chapter 4. In brief, any attack based on physical implementations of
security algorithms is classified as an SCA. Brute force and classical attacks related to the
weakness of algorithms are not included in this definition. Several types of SCAs, e.g.,
Power Analysis Attacks, Electromagnetic Attacks, and Timing Attacks are defined and
explained in this chapter. Thus, SCAs require information about the implemented device
and operating system. With respect to the Kerckhoffs’ well-known security assumptions,
the supplied key is the only secret information available to the attacker. Thus, any
information related to the implementation is easy to get to the attacker. Chapter 4 also
presents information on a brief survey on the above mentioned SCAs against a variety of
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crypto implementations and algorithms. Finally, several recommended countermeasures
against SCAs are shown.
Chapter 5 is the major new work of this thesis, which is focused on the timing side
channel attack against the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm - the suggested authentication
algorithm in IEC 62351. In other words, the execution time of the authentication algorithm
applied to the communications of substations is analyzed in order to be correlated with the
secret-related information of the algorithm. At the beginning of the chapter, details of the
HMAC-SHA1 algorithm are illustrated. Then, the attack description and general
assumptions are discussed. Finally, statistical regression models of timing side channel
leakage against the security features of the stored key, e.g., its length and Hamming weight,
are presented with the goal of revealing related secret information based on leakage
models. Since the utilized key size in the HMAC-SHA1 can be any value larger than zero,
the models would mitigate the cryptanalysis process of an attacker. All the results and
figures are illustrated at the end of Chapter 5. A summary and conclusion are given in
Chapter 6.
To the best of our knowledge at the time of this publication, this is the first time that
timing SCA against HMAC is investigated from the execution time of algorithm viewpoint.
Previous works have only considered the comparison times of received versus expected
signatures in the receiver side, which could be easily resolved by coding countermeasures.
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Chapter 2.
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and
Synchrophasor Network Architecture in Smart Grid

A smart grid is the next generation electrical power system that utilizes a modern twoway communication between power generators and consumers, with the goal of indicating
a global view of the health of the entire grid to the power grid operators, e.g. utilities.
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), as advanced measuring devices in the smart grid,
precisely monitor the voltage and current phasors through a timing reference prepared by
Global Positioning System (GPS). An overview of a smart grid system is shown in Figure
2.1.

Figure 2.1 An overview of a smart grid system.
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2.1 Smart Grid versus Traditional Power Grid
In addition to PMUs, a smart grid has different monitoring and measurement instruments
and devices that have a variety of functions, all of which support the objectives of realtime monitoring and control. The smart grid, a modernized traditional electrical grid,
comprises a variety of implemented measurements, sensors, and aggregators to achieve
these objectives. A brief comparison of traditional and modernized devices, as well as
their features and applications, is given below.
I.

SCADA systems vs. WAMS systems

While a great deal of measurements are taken in different geographical locations and not
fully synchronized, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is
responsible for continuous measurements to provide for the safety of procedures. SCADA
systems measure the voltage value and active, reactive, or injected power flow which has
been utilized in the power system for a long time [1]. However, these systems have some
disadvantages, such as a low transmission data rate, uncoordinated and asynchronous data
acquisition, and quasi-steady state evaluations. Moreover, SCADA systems in the current
power grid may not be able to dynamically monitor the power flows since they are based
on steady state power flow. Typically, data is updated at the rate of 0.1 to 0.25 Hz. Wide
Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) in the smart grid are responsible for presenting a
time-dependent snapshot of the grid. Thus, the phasor of voltage would be examined
dynamically with no state estimation required. WAMS includes high technologic
measurement devices, specifically in communications infrastructure. PMUs are considered
the most important and main technology of WAMS networks. Common WAMS includes
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PMUs, PDCs, Super PDCs, and some ordered communications networks. However, the
required bandwidth is greater than in traditional SCADA systems, which results in
modifying the current communications infrastructure [2].
With respect to [3], a fully integrated WAMS and SCADA communication network is
demonstrated in Figure 2.2 below.

Figure 2.2 Fully integrated WAMS and SCADA architecture and communication network.

II. State Estimators vs. Phasor Measurement Units
As indicated by its name, state estimators play a key role in estimating the state variables
in power system monitoring. Control centers use the SCADA measurements by
implementing state estimators. However, this leads to non-linearity of measured power and
state variables. State estimators have the same function as PMUs. They are responsible for
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measuring the phasor of voltage required for evaluating the power system. The
development of WAMS is based on PMUs as advanced measurement systems.

State

estimation techniques use the relationships between the measurements and the state
variables to be estimated which makes the grid observable in every instance. They are able
to measure both current and voltage phasors. Therefore, the non-linearity problem of
measurement and state variables is solved simpler and faster compared with SCADA
measurements.
In [1], the authors believed that the traditional state estimators could be upgraded by
PMUs to be more precise. Similar to PMUs, state estimators were responsible for providing
phase angle differences but in periods of a few minutes. In contrast, smart grid PMUs could
measure these differences in milliseconds or microseconds. Thus, PMUs provide high
resolution synchronized clock sources from GPS receivers to measure the magnitude and
phase angles of frequency, voltage, and current. They also monitor high voltage
transmission lines [2].
III.

Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs)

Phasor data calculated by PMUs, or other PDCs, are correlated and interpreted as a timestamped stream in a PDC node. In addition, PDCs evaluate the accuracy and quality of
received values. Demonstrating the wide area system measurement and performance, a
stream is inserted into the appropriate applications such as SCADA/EMS systems.
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IV.

Super Phasor Data Concentrator ( Super PDC)

Similar to PDCs, Super PDCs are responsible for collecting the remote PDC and PMU
phasor data prior to visualization. The collected data are accessible through a central
database linked to a Super PDC. Hence, a large amount of hard disks would not be required
to store all the collected data at a sampling rate of 30, 60 or 120 samples per second.
In this thesis, PMU features and vulnerabilities from a security point of view are studied.
After a brief introduction to PMUs and the need for these devices, the communication and
security protocols applied to the PMU substation automation system are discussed in
Chapter 2. In addition, a literature review of previous works related to security vulnerability
of PMUs and suggested solutions are presented. Finally, the timing side channel attack, as
the main contribution of this thesis, is introduced and investigated through the security
protocol of PMU substations in synchrophasor networks.
Other features of PMUs in smart grids are discussed, including the following:
1. Non-linearity of measurement and state variables;
2. More accurate state estimation by real-time and stability monitoring which
improves the post-disturbance assessment ability;
3. Island detecting in the presence of generation load-matching while circuits and grid
are not in time and synchronized;
4.

Increased reliability and robustness in distorted situations [1];

5. Dynamic system monitoring of the power grid which causes congestion expanses
to diminish and the consumed assets to grow;
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6. Real-time and accurate measurements of any local bus of the system, which leads
to wide area monitoring and visibility;
7. Monitoring the system’s measurements in a delay-sensitive highly data rate
manner, which leads to a rapid response of the system that is required in irregular
and anomalous situations;
8. Overload and voltage stability monitoring;
9. Adaptive protection; and
10. Restoration of the power system.
To achieve all of the above features, PMUs have to be weighted. This is a challenging
issue which is related to the final PDC, manufacturers’ classes of error, different accuracies
of available PMUs on the market, and the correctness of metering devices of chain.
Normalization of the measurements is mostly recommended for reducing the errors. Thus,
the weights of PMUs would play a key role in correctness of measured values. In other
words, the error measurements of low weight PMUs may be ignored while the errors of
higher weighted ones cause the entire measurements to be discarded. More details on
weighting PMUs are given in [4].
After a brief introduction of PMUs in the smart grid, we further discuss the motivations
of PMUs in the power grid, their block diagrams, and their placement in smart grid
communication infrastructures. Also, several common PMUs in today’s industry are
introduced.
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2.2 Motivation for PMUs
The most significant motivation for PMUs is to overcome voltage instability in the power
grid which leads to blackout. Instability is caused by an imbalance of consumption
compared with generation and transmission. In other words, load dynamics, transmission
and generation represent the three most significant factors in voltage failures [1].
Phasor measurement devices and phasor synchronization are not needed when only one
generator is available in the power grid. However, two or more generators require
synchronization. The outputs of generators are altered by changing the running speed of
different generators in the system, e.g., a little faster or slower running of one generator
over the other. PMUs are required for synchronizing the phase and frequency of the
connected generators of these power systems. For example, every two generators that
produce exactly 110 VAC at 60 Hz could connect and form a grid when there are zero
phase differences between them. However, any exception to this situation could result in a
blackout. The GPS receivers of the PMUs are responsible for synchronizing the accurate
and precise frequency and phase outputs of the generators.
Consequently, monitoring the entire grid with the goal of approaching an accurate
universal overview is essential for power data management engineers. In other words, the
knowledge of what exactly happens at specific times in a variety of geographic locations
plays a key role in the correctness of entire grid predictions and any ongoing controlling
decisions to prevent serious incidents [5].
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Due to the complexity of the North American power grid, which has 300,000 km power
lines and 500 entities, keeping the balance between the demand and supply of electricity
relies upon the coherent performance of cooperating entities. Currently, there is no realtime exchange of power grid status and information among these entities [6].
In [7], the authors studied the monitoring role of the first set of PMUs, installed in 2004,
on the June 15, 2005 blackout. The frequency and angle differences between two locations- Little Rock, AK and Houston, TX--were examined and illustrated in detail. As depicted
in publicly-available graphs and documents, 27 minutes prior to the blackout, the phase
differences were steady at around 35 degrees. However, an immediate angle difference
occurred at 5 p.m., which continued to increase and ended at the blackout trajectory of
passing a 120 degree phase difference just prior to the collapse of the network. Recloser
failure though the lines of two locations and increases in instant impedance due to line
outage are some of the reasons for the jump and phase differences.
With respect to the NERC report, the shortage of grid status awareness was the main
reason for the blackout in the Northeastern United States as well as southern Canada in
2003, prior to the PMUs being installed in 2004. Regarding [6], it had an economic impact
of billions of dollars.
Hence, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been investigating the possibility of
synchrophasor technology in the North American power grid. The North American
Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI), in collaboration with the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) and many other organizations, has been established. The
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complete coverage of the transmission grid by 2014 was one of the objectives of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [6].

2.3 The Functional Diagram of PMU
As an important instrument of Wide Area Monitoring and Control (WAMC) systems,
PMU is responsible for continuous monitoring of the health and precision of the power
grid. Voltage and current phases of power systems are precisely monitored by PMUs. All
the measured values are based on the reference time prepared by GPS receivers of the
PMUs. Thus, the accurate synchronized and real-time measurements are transmitted to the
control center to monitor the operation of the power grid. Delivering the delay-sensitive
measurements of PMUs is highly dependent upon the communication network’s reliability
and Quality of Service (QoS). In [8], the author has claimed that non-sufficient and proper
communication infrastructures are the major parameters preventing the broad utilizations
of PMUs in the distribution side of the power grid as it covers a huge area.

2.4 PMU Block Diagrams
The first PMU was built and assembled in 1988 by Dr. Arun G. Phadke and Dr. James
S. Thorp at Virginia Tech Power Systems Research Laboratory [2]. The goal of PMUs is
to continuously sample the analog measured voltage, normally 20, 30 or 60 samples per
second, and the current and frequency in synchronicity and time-stamp them using the
precise clock of GPS receivers. The time-stamped measurements are called
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synchrophasors, which lead to synchronizing and time aligning the different location
measurements. Thus, a grid snapshot is created by these precise clocks [9]. Moreover, line
frequencies are evaluated at each side. Hence, the phasors of different locations would be
evaluated as a result of such corresponding samplings. Generally, a phasor refers to another
representation of sinusoidal waveform with magnitude and phase, or a phase angle which
is defined as the difference of the signal peak and a reference such as time equal to zero.
Phase angle differences of a group of calculated measured phasors are calculated by
assuming one phasor measurement as reference. However, the result is independence of
the selected reference.
Practically, in an AC power system, a higher voltage phase angle causes the power to
flow to the lower phase angle voltage. More voltage phase differences between two
locations leads to more statistic stress applied to the corresponding power grid, which also
affects the stability of the grid.
A block diagram of a PMU, including Digital Signal Processors for measuring the AC
signal of 50/60 Hz at a variety of sampling rates, Analog to Digital Converters of each
phase, as well as phase-lock oscillator alongside the GPS receiver for a synchronized
sampling rate of 1 millisecond accuracy, is illustrated in Figure 2.3 [10].
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Figure 2.3 Block diagram of PMU.

2.5 IEEE C37.118 Standard
Several standards and protocols support the communication infrastructures of PMUs with
other components of the smart grid. These standards are introduced in subsequent chapters.
The latest version of the PMU/PDC protocol, IEEE C37.118, is discussed in this chapter.
IEEE C37.118 is the substitute for the previous IEEE 1344 synchrophasor protocol used
in PMUs since 1998. IEEE 1344 did not include the response time, the accuracy of
measurements, the phasor measuring process, and the hardware and software as well as
security or transport specifications in implementation of the protocol. The synchronization
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source is the number of seconds from the epoch of January 1, 1970 (AKA seconds-of-thecentury (SOC)) related to Network Time Protocol (NTP) and Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC). The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) signified the IEEE C37.118 in
2006 to overcome the previous standard shortcomings. The revisions included, for
example, phasor measurements of several PMUs, compatibility with other standards, and
sample modification to the order of fraction of seconds compatible with the standard
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61850:2000. However, neither IEEE
1344 nor IEEE C37.118 supports authentications or integrity or confidentiality features
that make the WAMS vulnerable to malicious data being injected into the PDC and state
estimators [3]. Thus, each PMU comes along with the IEEE C37.118 standard.
The goal of IEEE C37.118 is to clarify the “frame” format of data transmitted from PMU
to PDC. The communication media is not specifically constraint while four specific frame
named as: Configuration, Data, Command, and Header frame are defined. The first three
are binary and the last is ASCII. The data frame is defined as the measured values of PMUs
and the most frequent transmitting frame in the order of a few hundred bytes [11]. For
instance, the Entergy system includes 22 PMUs and sends 84 measurements per packet, as
claimed in [7]. The phasor vector, frequency, rate of changing frequency, signed three
phase voltage, current, real and active power, and individual phase RMS values, and
detecting unbalanced conditions are some of the values including the data message. A
machine-readable message and configuration are responsible for calibration.
Finally, 16 bytes of a humanly readable header are included in each transmitted packet
of a PMU and defined by the user [3]. Since the header and command messages are not
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frequent, e.g., per minute of header message, transmitting, they could transmit through
TCP/IP. A processing computer system is utilized, which is based on “low power Xeon
class CPUs configured to run Windows 2008 standard 64 bit server operating system” in
the PMUs’ manufacturer specifications in the CSSP. This is in the range of $3500 [7]. An
overview of the payload configuration is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Payload structure of data frame in synchrophasor [8].

The transmission rate of the data frame is related to the sampling rate when considering
PMU. Regarding the number of phasors the desired PMU is measuring, as well as analog
or digital signals, the data frame size is changed. For instance, the baud rate of a port is
defined as the transmitting capability in serial communications. In a 12 phasor channel
PMU, Table 2.2 indicates the reporting rate and transferring capability of data [11].
Reporting Frequency is assigned in IEEE C37.118-2005 as 10, 25 Hz for a 50 Hz power
system, and 10, 12, 15, 20, 30 Hz for a 60 Hz system. Reporting frequency is defined as
the load of PMU and the maximum delay of PMU to PDC communication.
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If Reporting Frequency is defined as Fs, and the maximum delay as Dmax, then:
Dmax = 1 / Fs
The maximum delay could be great as the packet is received before the next packet is
available.

Table 2.2 Predicted number of phasor channel can be transmitted in correlation with baud rates and
reporting rate of PMU over serial port. 10 bits including one start bit, one bit and 8 bits data are
considered for transmitting each byte of data. (*Actual number may be less than the prepared
number since calculated bandwidth is close to baud rate [11].)

Table 2.3 Kbit per seconds (Kbit/s), by considering 20 measurements per PMU [9].

Moreover, the approximate bandwidth in the order of Kbits/sec versus the PMUs’
sampling rate and the number of PMUs is indicated in [9]. Thus, consumption bandwidth
is about 57 kbps for two PMUs by UDP.
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2.6 PMU Deployment
A 10 phasor PMU is a common model which is simply installed. Each phase shows 3
phase voltage or 3 phase current. A power connection, ground connection of station, GPS
antenna connection, and communications circuit connection are required connections for
each PMU. For communications circuit connections, a modem and Ethernet are needed in
case of 4-wire and network connections, respectively. A GPS receiver antenna is installed
on the roof of each substation. Each phasor of three phases is required for these
connections. While PMU installation is complete, the PMU is linked to a PDC via
communications circuit connections [10].

2.7 The Placement of PMUs in a Smart Grid
A traditional utility power system includes generation, transmission, distribution, and
consumer parts. Carrying the highest voltage level of typically 138 – 1000 kV, the
transmission system is responsible for some problems like blackouts [12].
Generally, PMUs are designed for the transmission network in the power grid as
illustrated in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 PMU installation in the smart grid for islanding detection of generators.

Most of the power utilities have currently installed PMUs in high voltage substations;
however, PMUs are also intended to monitor high voltage transmission lines.
Distribution networks have different features which leads to different measurement
methods. As illustrated above, locating the PMUs at two ends of the transmission line is
the easiest form of monitoring the voltage and power [1]. Entergy was the first company
to utilize PMUs on the transmission as well as the distribution sides [7].
Currently, many PMUs are installed in the United States due to the DOE Smart Grid
Investment Grant (SGIG) programs. More than 1,000 PMUs are estimated to be installed
by nine SGIG grantees in the last three years alone [7]. However, all of them are
constrained by the high level voltage parts of the power grid such as power plants and
transmission substations. Since the renewable energy sources, e.g., solar cells, that are
located in the distribution side play a key role in the future of the smart grid, some realtime applications are recommended for the reliability of frequencies and voltages [8]. This
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leads to the use of an intermediary power supply of solar cells as well as electric vehicles.
PMUs are also expected to be installed in commercial and residential accommodations as
well [7]. SGIG grantees also suggested redundancy of PMU measurements to prevent the
loss of data as much as possible.
In [13], NASPI released documents illustrating the distribution of installed PMUs in the
North American Power Grid up to 2012. The installed PMUs in Europe as of 2012 are
depicted in [1].

2.8 Common PMUs in Industry
Different size of PMUs are available in industry according to the variety of digital signal
processing techniques. For instance, the PMUs that measure 10 phasors in addition to the
frequency are categorized as large, while the three phasors plus the frequency PMUs are
also found in industry. Larger sizes of PMUs cost as much as $30,000 to $40,000 more
than smaller PMUs [10].

In addition, some portable types of PMUs that work over GPRS nodes are recently being
used in industry. They have small dimensions and are easy to install and implement
anywhere, and no ventilation is required. Moreover, measurement data are accessible
through web clients such as PCs, laptops, and smart phones [14].
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2.9 Synchrophasor Network Architecture
PMUs, PDCs, and Super PDCs, described in the previous part of Chapter 2, are some of
the important tools of a phasor network. Other devices as well as their hierarchical
communication models will be discussed below. It is important to know that the
Synchrophasor Network Architecture presented in this chapter is one of the most common
models that are discussed in a variety of references. Many other aspects of PMU
communications are also mentioned in different resources. For example, wide area PMU
communications over WiMAX/IEEE 802.16 networks are analyzed in [8]. In this situation,
locally IP-based PMU measurements are routed to a PDC via a local communications
network and then to the Central Control Network (CCN) through the backbone network.
Thus, the PMU interface performs as a Subscriber Station (SS) while the PDC acts as a
Base Station (BS) in a WiMAX-based network. IP multicasting approach is also considered
in [6]. At the end of this chapter, the security requirements of PMUs will be discussed.

2.10 Smart Grid Communication Infrastructure
First, a brief review of smart grid communication infrastructures will be given below.
The communication infrastructures of a smart grid include Home Area Networks (HANs),
e.g., industrial, commercial business, and home sites; Field Area Networks (FANs)
supported by deploying Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI); Substation Area
Networks (SANs) over an electric substation containing PMUs; Wide Area Networks
(WANs) or backhaul communications defined as connections of FANs and SANs, and
control centers with substations; and Local Area Networks (LANs) [12].
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A substation network is a remote site of a SCADA operation. IEC 61850 is working to
improve the SAN to communicate with other substations through “substation-to-substation
communications.” A high level overview of a smart grid communication infrastructure
compared with an electrical infrastructure is shown in Figure 2.1.

2.11 Synchrophasor Network
Communications between one PMU and one PDC form the simplest part of the phasor
network in a smart grid. However, one PDC's aggregated real-time measured data come
from different PMUs located in vital substations. First, the correctness of data is
investigated though Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and kept in internal memory. All
the restored data are accessible and synchronized by a UTC clock. Finally, by comparing
the time-stamped data, the measured data would be rearranged and aligned based on their
UTC time similarities [2]. Different software, e.g., RTDMS, are implemented through the
personal computer at the output port of each PDC to calculate and show the local measured
values such as voltage, current, frequency, MW and MVAR for operators. The higher layer
includes a Super PDC which is responsible for an interconnection-wide snapshot based on
received data from the PDCs [10].

2.12 WAMS Architecture
Figure 2.5 shows the WAMS hardware and communication architecture [2].
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Figure 2.5 WAMS hardware and communication architecture.

The main components of WAMS are substations with PMUs, substations with PDCs, an
SPDC, a real office, and WANs.
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PMU Substation

As depicted, PMUs are located in the lowest level of WAMS in the PMU locations.
PMUs are responsible for generating more than 50% of WAMS' network data [3]. Thus,
the reliability of entire WAMS in higher layers depends on the accuracy of PMUs installed
in substations for measurement collection and communication. In addition to PMUs, digital
relays and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) are located as basic measuring tools in
PMU substations, which are all connected by shared media access 100 Mbps Ethernet.
Moreover, routers are responsible for connecting the Ethernet of intra-substations with
local area networks. All these phasor measurements have to be centralized in a monitoring
center. Increasing the number of PMUs leads to increasing the data volume and traffic.


PDC Substation

PDCs can also be linked to the Ethernet-shared media of the substations, mentioned
above. The time-stamped and aligned measurements of all regional PMUs would be
transmitted to the Super PDC by the PDC. Moreover, PDCs can apply specific control
decisions regarding the received data. In a larger number of distributed PMUs, the
communications backbone between PDCs may become a communication bottleneck in
WAMS.


Super PDC (SPDC node)

Located at the highest level of WAMS architecture, the Super PDC is able to store and
analyze the received measurements of the lower level. Moreover, all the controlling
decisions, and many of the monitoring and global protection patterns of WAMS
architecture, are governed by the SPDC. Any data center, phasor data processing center, or
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System Control Center (SCC) could affect the SPDC. It is also responsible for returning
the time critical commands to equipment and controllers.


Relay Office

The relay office records and stores any relay task logs and relay alarms, and remotely
looks over the relay parameters.

2.13 WAMS Communications Infrastructure
The WAMS network uses several communication infrastructures ranging from serial
communication to VPN [3].


Serial Communication

As a continuance of the SCADA network, the WAMS network uses serial
communication similar to SCADA, for the most part. It utilizes high speed modems to at
least 30 samples per data requirement. Those modems are vulnerable to several attacks and
reveal the critical data to attackers through command sequences. The data format through
serial communication is RS-232 with a speed range of 2400 to 115,200 bps.


Analog Microwave

Microwave is implemented in WAMS for connecting the remote PMUs to the PDC in
the absence of wire communication. Similar to wireless commination, it is susceptible to
jamming, traffic analyzing, and signal monitoring and recording.
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Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)

The secure communication of two entities over an insecure public network by utilizing a
variety of technologies is defined as virtual private networks (VPNs). IPSEC is the
suggested security protocol suite for authentication, encryption, and key establishment of
WAMS data which are being transmitted over internet protocol (IP). Since it is assigned to
layer three of the OSI model and encrypts the network data and addresses, WAMS users
are able to insert incorrect data and gain access to entire and unauthorized network data.
The three layers of intra-substation local area networks (LANs), high-performance
regional networks, and wide-area fiber-optic networks are defined below [2].


Intra-substation local area networks (LANs)
Implemented protocols in this LANs, e.g. IEC 61850, can run over the large
transmission bandwidth gigabit Ethernet in order to guarantee the 4 millisecond
response time.



High-performance Regional Networks
Connecting distributed PMUs to one PDC, these networks are controlled by
independent utilities only for power systems. Measurement data received by PDC
may be used for making the regional protection decisions.



Wide-area Fiber-optic Networks
PDC data are transmitted to the SPDC through this kind of network. Real-time
command could be send back to a variety of equipment and controllers from SPDC.
Since the volume of data will significantly increase by increasing the number of
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PMUs in the smart grid, the communication backbone of PDCs could be a
bottleneck in the WAMS.

2.14 Security Requirements in WAMS
Some specific features have to be considered in securing the phasor data transmission of
a WAMS network to deliver real-time streaming phasor data and the state of the smart grid.
The application layer of the OSI model includes the protocols of streaming data, which do
not include the security standards. Thus, the author of [3] believed that those standards
have to be included in lower layers. Even though confidentiality and integrity of data are
so crucial, the availability and real-time response of data should not be affected. Data
signatures, using Hash-based Message Authentication code (HMAC) with a shared key,
are sent with the PMUs’ measurements to prevent unauthorized and dishonest commands.
Moreover, confidentiality has to be considered while the data is transmitted over public
networks such as the Internet. A fast and light encryption algorithm, such as AES as a
symmetric algorithm, is recommended. A simple solution for confidentiality and
authentication of the data over Internet-based protocols would be IP Security (IPSEC)
VPNs as well as a combination of TLS and IPSEC named DTLS. Another solution would
be a private WAMS network such as NERCNet, used by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC), along with IEEE standards. Since UDP transport is
utilized for streaming data, the TLS protocol cannot be applied. Another approach would
be implementing VPN or encrypting serial link devices between the PMU and the PDC. In
addition, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Diffie-Hellman are some of the well-known
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key distribution algorithms, for a small number of devices, to prepare the shared key of
different recommended symmetric security algorithms. The best key distribution is chosen
by considering the network architecture and implemented protocols.

2.15 Phasornetwork Cyber Security Standards


IEC 62351- suggested security standards and protocols through communication
media



NERC CIP 002-009 - provided cyber security standards



IEEE 1686-2007 – investigated the security of measurements with respect to the
IEEE 1686-2007, security measures over IEDs (intelligent electronic devices)



IEEE C37.118 - communications protocol of PMU measurements and
communications; previously discussed in this chapter.



NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 -guidelines for federal information systems



FIPS 199 and FIPS 200 - basis of system classifications [15].

2.16 IEC 61850 Communication Protocol Categories
Introduced by IEC Technical Committee 57 (TC57), the IEC 61850 standard signifies
the communication protocol over the serial and modern computer type of technology which
uses the TCP/IP model and Ethernet-shared media access encapsulation methods of PMU
substations. IEC 61850 covers the entire communication requirements of substation
automation systems which are not dependent on the manufacturer of instruments. It maps
the data model in a group of protocols being able to run over Ethernet-shared media access,
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such as Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS), Generic Object-Oriented
Substation Events (GOOSE), and Sampled Measured Values (SMV). Thus, 4 ms of
response time is guaranteed based on the gigabit transmission bandwidth of Ethernet [2].
The sub-layers of IEC are presented in Table 2.4 [16].
Table 2.4 Sub-layer of IEC

The protocol is defined in both the vertical and horizontal directions. Certifying the
significant connections of IEDs, which could be the encapsulation of GOOSE into the
Ethernet frame or recommended serial link, and the TCP/IP model are used for horizontal
and vertical directions, respectively. For time synchronization, non-reliable UDP is
utilized. A connection-oriented TCP/IP protocol is recommended for ASCI MMS
communications. The highest accepted time delivery is 10 milliseconds. As type one and
type four, GOOSE and SV are categorized as fast and prime message data, respectively.
GOOSE, SMV (Sampled Measured Values) and MMS (ACSI basics) are three main
protocols utilized in IEC 61850.
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2.16.1 SMV (Sampled Measured Values)
The measured data of sensors such as CTs and VTs are transmitted through the SMV
method. Ethernet Multicast and unicast communication via serial lines are implemented in
the lower layer of ISO. Regarding IEC 61850-7-2, four different application and transport
networking profiles are addressed below:


Client/server model



GOOSE/GSE control



GSSE services



Time synchronization

2.16.2 GSE/GOOSE communication profiles
Fast and reliable data transfer is provided through the GSE (Generic Substation Event)
control model, introduced in IEC 61850, by UCA2.0 status messages. Multicast data
communication is mostly applied to the GOOSE and GSE events [16].
Developing the IEC 61850 communication protocols as well as IEC 62351-part 6, the
cyber security standard, improves the substations automation system.

2.17 Introduction to IEC 62351
The goal of this protocol is to secure the communication protocols of IEC-TC 57,
particularly the IEC 60870-5, IEC 60870-6, IEC 61850, IEC 61970, and IEC 61968 series.
To secure the two main parts of IEC 61850, the client server (i.e., MMS) and real-time
(GOOSE and SV), several methods are used [17].
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MMS
The security is defined under the application and transport layers as peer
authentication and TLS, respectively. Including the X.509 encoded certificate and
time-stamped values, the authorized information are transmitted in ACSE AARQ
and

AARE

PDUs.

TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA1

and

TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA2 are the minimum suggested cipher
suites.


GOOSE/Sampled Values
Since the transmitted data is time-critical, only the message authentication is
recommended. Thus, encryption and message confidentiality is not supported. The
GOOSE/SV PDUs are concatenated with the calculated signing value of SHA256
hash using RSA.

2.17.1 Performance concerns in IEC 62351 Part 6
Performance issues play a key role in introducing any communication protocol, including
encryption and authentication, regarding constrained resources such as response time.
In [17], the authors applied and investigated the main limitations of securing the SV and
GOOSE. As an example of real-time constraints of both GOOSE and SV, a 3 millisecond
response time is required for GOOSE and up to 12 KHz of sampling rate for Sampled
Values. Other limitations include the computational power of RTUs and IEDs as well as
changing and upgrading issues of embedded devices. As the real-time application of
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PMUs, the authentication implementations of GOOSE and SV packets are investigated by
authors. The RSA algorithm in C for signing the SHA256 hash value is suggested and
investigated in several software and platforms. Results indicate that current IEDs would
not meet the real time requirements even though those platforms’ memory and CPU
processors exceed the requirements for common embedded devices. In other words, at least
4 milliseconds is needed for signing the measurements by 1024 bits of key length, which
is the minimum response time of the entire GOOSE message. One has to consider that
significant changes in the hardware of embedded devices should not be easily adopted.
Table 2.5 shows the execution time of implementing RSA signing on two platforms. As
the table shows, the minimum time is 1.5 milliseconds, corresponding to 512 bits key size,
which is not an optimum assumption.

Table 2.5 Execution time of RSA implementation in two different platforms.

Also, RSA crypto chips can support the response time of 23.8 microseconds for a 1024bit key length. However, it requires remodeling and redesigning the overall hardware that
contains the external memory, or even the cooling systems. Finally, the latest results show
that authentication of real-time data would not be feasible by today’s embedded devices.
They require managing 100 and 300 packets per second in GOOSE and receiving 4000
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packets per second along with several tasks, e.g., protection mechanisms, time
synchronization, logging, etc. Consequently, the TC 57 WG group in October 2009 decided
to replace the asymmetric signing by symmetric cryptography and use of HMACs.
Moreover, according to [18], HMAC-SHA1 and AES-128 must be included in this
standard.

2.18 WAMS Communication Network Modeling
Figure 2.6 shows the skeletal network model and composition of the smart grid in a
wide geographic location such as the United States map.

Figure 2.6 Skeletal network model of the smart grid in the map of the United States.
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Formed as a ring topology of an optical fiber network implementing SDH, Routing Nodes
(RN) are shown in an octagon pattern, which is located in backbone network [2]. Each RN
contains a variety of numbers of high performance networking routers. Two different RNs
are linked over LH as 155.520 Mbps SDH STM-1. In addition, there are triangles indicating
the LAN routers. The circle and rhomb nodes illustrate the PMU substation and PDC
substation nodes, respectively. In other words, the PMU substation nodes indicate ones
without PDC while the others include the PDC as well as the PMU. One PDC substation
node is located in any specific area and the same regional area substations are linked to one
routing node. Substations and RNs are linked via LL modeled as 2.048 Mbps E1 links,
which can be modified to LH if needed. In particular, only one SPDC is considered in the
WAMS as high-level monitoring. The same LH link also connects the SPDC and the
corresponding RN.
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Chapter 3. Overview of PMU Security

Secure real-time data measurement and transmission is required in a smart grid. Thus, a
great deal of security and measurement protocols are applied to PMUs to protect and
increase the safety of monitoring data. These protocols constrain heavy computation and
time and energy consumption, and result in many other limitations to the PMUs. All these
constraints, as well as some application PMUs such as real-time data delivery, lead to a
tradeoff between energy consumption and the level of security. Consequently, the safety
of measured data could not be guaranteed and different security threats would affect the
integrity of data. More details on the balance between security and energy consumption, as
well as different security levels of PMU monitoring in a smart grid, are discussed in [19].
The authors have classified the level of sensor node security into four groups: level zero,
non-security service; level one, single security service (one encryption or authentication);
level two, double security services (one encryption and authentication); and level 3, triple
security services (two encryptions and authentication). Each of these levels would be
required for specific type of WAMS sensors, and not all the security algorithms are needed
for all sensors. As a proof of this classification, the level one authentication by digital
signature, is the only security algorithm included in IEC 62351. Also, the integrity and
tamper detection can be ensured by authentication and digital signature. More details on
synchrophasor protocols, communication protocols, and security standards were discussed
in Chapter 2.
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With respect to [20], availability is one of the fundamental security objectives of data.
However, any lack of functionality in monitoring systems such as power outages in the
PMUs leads to not delivering the real-time data. It also causes inaccuracy in the continuous
monitoring data and the smart grid in general. In this regard, a UPS-like power source is
the suggested solution indicated in [5]. Storing system files and momentary acquisition
files on separate storage are organized in order to recover the corrupted data.
The goal of this paper is to improve a cost-effective PMU-like device. In addition, the
GPS receiver plays a key role in time-stamping and synchronizing of the measured data by
PMUs. In addition, the environmental conditions of measuring humidity, temperature,
power quality, etc., play a key role in the PMU functionality and accuracy of measured
data. The authors also suggested the VPN tunnel implementation in order to achieve the
authentications and security, although it has to carry the tunnel data and it reduces the
MTU.
In [21], the authors explored how reconnaissance attacks, packet injection attacks, and
denial of service attacks on PMUs and PDCs can affect the wide area monitoring systems
and wide area protection systems, as a part of such systems. All mentioned attacks
experience losses in the visibility of power and control systems. The authors recommended
some cyber security testing of PMUs and PDCs to reduce these vulnerabilities. For
instance, containing SSL and IPSEC features in order to achieve integrity and
confidentiality is recommended. Moreover, the U.S. NERC - CIP states that entities should
recognize the Cyber Security Assets (CCAs). Thus, PMUs and PDCs, as added systems,
must decide if they are CCAs, which relates to the specific application that would
implement the synchrophasor data.
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The details of the above-mentioned attacks and the proposed solutions of the authors are
explained below.


Reconnaissance Attacks: Reconnoitering and identifying the system before attack
by cyber attackers is defined as a reconnaissance attack. It leads to finger printing
the connected systems and learning about opening ports, as well as maintaining
remote operating system versions and remote network stack daemons. For testing
these attacks over PMUs and PDCs, NMAP has been used [22]. The MODBUS
address and MODBUS point are also scanned. The Wireshark network protocol
analyzer is applied for catching the plaintext passwords in flight between remote
systems, the PMU and the PDC. A password is required for authentication prior to
remote access and control [23]. In addition to the information obtained by
eavesdropping on IEEE C37.118 network traffic, attackers could access the PMU
location. The IP addresses of PMUs and PDCs are identified in NMAP by an insider
or network penetrator. Regarding the authors' idea, putting SSL or IPSEC between
a firewall at the substation and the remote control room to encrypt network traffic
is suggested as a solution for this type of attack. However, the traffic of the control
room LAN or substation would not be encrypted. Although the authors believe in
the essence of encryption algorithms, to the best of our knowledge, IEC 61850 905 is not a suggested encryption algorithm due to implementation constraints and the
importance of real-time data transmission in the smart grid over PMUs.



Packet Injection Attacks: sensor measurement injection and command injection are
defined as two types of Packet Injection Attacks. As the name implies, injecting
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false sensor data and commands into the control system defines each type,
respectively. Also, the attackers aim to inject false supervisory control actions into
a control system and overwrite the C code, ladder logic, and the register settings of
a substation’s devices such as PMUs, PDCs, IEDs, etc. This attack is achieved
through a PDC or multi PMUs. Ettercap, as a man-in-the-middle attack node, is
implemented to alternate the IEEE C37.118 frame of data to invalid measurement,
and inject and transmit from PMU to PDC. Some of the PMUs contains MODBUS
or DNP3 interfaces for remote monitoring with no cryptographic signatures which
would be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. IPSEC and SSL are
recommended for each node. They lead to confidentiality and integrity [21].
Recently, IEC 61850 is considered as a communication protocol of a substation’s
LAN between PMUs, IEDs, relays, etc. and the router. This protocol includes the
security part by cryptographic signature, which obviously reduces the possibility of
such an attack. In the previous chapter, these standards as well as their
vulnerabilities were discussed in detail. As another countermeasure for a false data
injection attack to mitigate its effect on the estate estimation process, in [24], the
authors introduced a novel algorithmic process for the trust metrics attributed to the
agents. Their method is based on a multi-agent filtering scheme. For this, intelligent
agents, such as PDCs which are in the communication network with SCADA and
receive measurement from PMUs, apply a trust metric to their neighbors. In other
words, they compute local estimation of the state based on both their own
measurements and those of their neighbors. Hence, it is based on the long-term
performance of the agents. Any untrusted agents’ measurement would be discarded
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in the future as the filtering pattern. Also, low trusted agents have less impact on
evaluating the estate estimation. Thus, the multi-agent filtering and trust-based
mechanism are combined. In [25], the author presented another approach for
dealing with and detecting false data injection attacks on DC state estimation. In
addition, another type of injecting the false data includes the Time Synchronization
Attack and GPS Spoofing, which attack the synchrophasor measurement systems
by forged GPS signals. More details of these attacks are further discussed in this
chapter.


Denial of Service Attacks: generally, any distraction of communication links
between remote terminal units and master terminals or human machine resources
is defined as a DOS attack, according to [21]. A DOS attack leads to non-responsive
hardware and software in control systems. In synchrophasor devices such as PMUs
and WAMPAC systems, it leads to loss of visibility and breaks the control loop,
respectively. Thus, the automated event detection algorithm would be blocked. The
MU Dynamics MU-4000 Analyzer [26] has been implemented for evaluating and
testing denial of service. The database of the analyzer indicates some known DOS
attacks such as LAND attacks, tear-drop attacks, ICMP attacks, etc. which are
experienced in PMUs and PDC as well. The tests also included the man-in-themiddle attack. Different methods for testing DOS attacks are presented in the paper.
For instance, fuzzing as a protocol mutation method is discussed. In fuzzing,
network packets are created randomly and assigned all alternate values of the
packet fields. The goal is to evaluate all the value possibilities prior to being
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discovered by an adversary. This method could vary based on different devices.
ARP, TCP, UDP, IP, ICMP, DNP3, MODBUS, IEEE C37.118, and HTTP are the
mutated protocols for the PMU and PDCs. Some of the recognized problems of
fuzzing include crashing of individual network services, crashing of applications
running on devices, and unintended soft resetting of affected devices. The authors
recommended analyzing the protocol mutation of all PMUs before inserting them
in the network. As another method, all the devices become non-responsive when
there is a huge volume of traffic, although they will react differently such as reset
and hang. The experimental results showed that PMUs and PDCs become more
non-responsive in the presence of huge network traffic. As a result, packet rate has
to be considered in planning these systems, and the maximum accepted level of
traffic congestion has to be evaluated within the substation. Human administrators
can control and mitigate the packet rates while observing systems. The traffic
between the PMU and the PDC could automatically be configured, although the
possibility of closing the port carrying critical traffic is also considered by the
authors. Moreover, transmitting and time-stamping a great deal of measurements
leads to not meeting the requested accuracy of one microsecond with respect to
IEEE C37.118 and increases the delay. Since PDC will drop any delayed packets
and begin to interpolate, testers have to be sure about the queue level of PMU
packets. Redundancy is revealed as another approach dealing with DOS attacks
[27]. However, the network complexity and scalability would be affected, which
has to be considered in network design.
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The authors of [27] also believed in having a high level of resources for dealing with
latency and security issues from the availability point of view. A wireless scheme of DOS
attack is named a PHY attack in [28]. The authors have classified the PHY attacks in four
groups: eavesdropping, jamming, restricting access, and injecting. Any malicious
performance impacting the wireless network communications is defined as a PHY attack.
Since the wireless medium has a shared nature, everyone in range can interrupt
transmissions. This could possibly done by simply injecting false data.
The Data Integrity Cyber Attack is another type of attack in a smart grid, as demonstrated
in [29]. In a Data Integrity Cyber Attack, the attackers change the measurements and
readings of some cooperating and compromised power meters. These cyber-attacks are
essentially unobservable. They could pass over any bad data detection algorithms to remain
unobservable. Obviously, this leads to a great deal of mistakes in state estimation
algorithms. Known and secure PMUs located in certain buses are implemented in this
research. In this paper, finding the minimum number of PMUs with the goal of mitigating
such attack is discussed. PMUs are networked on the newer NASPInet architecture for
secure data transmission. The authors show that p+1 PMUs at certain chosen buses could
neutralize the group of p cyber-attacks.
Evaluating and investigating the traffic features such as time, volume data, etc. on links
and finding their correlations leads to another type of attack in synchrophasor
measurements, called Traffic Analysis Attacks [30]. The relevant parameters, such as
number of packets, could be released by dividing the time into fixed size across two links.
In synchrophasor measurements such as PMUs, whether any encryption algorithms are
provided or not, the timing transmission data would be released by traffic analyzers.
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Moreover, random delays or similar approaches would not apply to the real-time data. As
a passive attack, attackers can identify the network hosts such as PMUs as well as their
locations. Consequently, those identified nodes could be attacked. Mixing the data
concatenation and dropping the selective ones is suggested as a countermeasure for these
challenges in [30]. Therefore, the same size packets periodically generated in the PMUs
make the correlation process simpler for adversaries. As a countermeasure, PMU random
size single packets are produced by concatenating the random number of contiguous
measurements. However, the maximum required network latency is as defined by the
maximum number of measurement data to be concatenated. Thus, data concatenation
thwarts any size correlations. Encryption is also suggested to destroy the packet content
correlations.
Regarding the importance of synchronization in the smart grid, the authors in [31]
challenged and analyzed the impact of Time Synchronization Attacks to WAMS in the
smart grid. Accurate timing information has a significant impact on fault detection and
event location estimation in the smart grid. Thus, the well-known GPS spoofing is one of
the highly probable attacks in smart grid measurement systems. The three main functions
of PMUs, namely fault detection in the transmission line, monitoring the stability of
voltage, and event locationing, could be affected by TSAs. GPS receivers play a key role
in PMU operations. However, by injecting forged time signals, an attacker could alternate
the time samples. Although much research has identified the possibility of a GPS spoofing
attack, [32] recently studied a real and practical one. Also, a complete GPS spoofing attack
as well as experimental results are examined in [33]. No physical contact, hacking or
authentication is required. The attacker only needs to move around the Time Synchronized
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Measuring Devices (TSMDs). The problem is that most of the TSMDs are only resistant
to the noise and loss packets. Smoothing filtering as a suggested countermeasure is
suggested in [31].
In addition to GPS spoofing, GPS jamming is also studied; however, GPS jamming is
not as distressing as spoofing due to its elective error effects compared with false decisions
of spoofing. In [34], the GPS Spoofing Receiver Clock Offset of PMUs is discussed in
detail. Since the PMU measurement would be synchronized and time-stamped by
implementing the clock offset, incorrect time information leads to incorrect phasor
computations of voltage and currents.
The GPS received signal is used by PMUs to evaluate its position and clock offset with
the onboard satellite clock. The goal of the authors is to maximize alternations among the
receiver’s clock offset with and without attack. As the most difficult attack to detect,
according to the authors’ opinion, any number of observable satellites are highly
vulnerable. An attacker could increase the power and number of malicious signals to any
number of victims. The maximum phase differences based on spoofing are also evaluated
by authors. While the proposed attack is based on changing the encoded data and not the
signal characteristics, the authors of [35] defined another type of spoofing, namely the
Replay Attack. This attack is based on inserting a delay in satellite signals and not
modifying the encoding process. Since the attacker manipulates the delay of signals and
not their content, having a closely calculated position relative to that before the attack is
impossible through a few number of visible satellites. The receiver would alarm in the
presence of huge and sudden changes and jumps possibly made by an attacker. Thus, the
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proposed formulation of a spoofing attack in [34] included some restraints to overcome the
alarm systems.
In addition to jamming and spoofing, blocking is named as another vulnerability of GPS
systems that could disturbance the correctness of PMU measurements. It is defined as
blocking the GPS signal to be received by the GPS system antennas in a phasor network
and in PMUs. Thus, strong physical security is essential, such as placement of antennas
and using physical security sensors. The authors also suggested different timing sources as
a solution for spoofing and jamming. These could be supplied from installed devices in
substations or some PMU ports, e.g., management ports [3].
In [36], the authors pointed out how important effective cybersecurity solutions are in
terms of cryptographic key management, authentication, and encryption for SCADA and
PMU.
According to the critical role of topology and state estimation in real-time operation of
control centers and the smart grid, a novel cyber-attack called a State and Topology Attack
is introduced. By modifying the network data and state, an attacker deceives the state
estimators’ parts. As a result of a topology attack, a connected transmission link could be
configured as disconnected or vice versa. In this event, there is an improper delay response
or load shedding by the control center. Therefore, an undetectable state attack is achievable
while an undetectable topology attack is executable. The authors in [37] and [38] also
investigated the significant impact of state and topology attacks on real-time pricing. [39]
claimed that changing the meter data such as PMUs measurements, which leads to incorrect
state estimations, would not be detected by control centers. However, the adversary has to
overcome bad network and meter data detectors in power systems. Secure placement of
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PMU is suggested by the authors of the paper in order to achieve the secure measurements'
resistance to a man-in-the-middle attack as well.
The paper assumed the possibility of attacking all measurements except those from
secure PMUs. They believed that buses with secure PMUs which construct a vertex of
cover of topology are able to recognize these attacks. In recent years, many studies have
proposed countermeasures for undetectable state and topology attacks [40, 41, and 42]. In
particular, secure PMUs are suggested and investigated by numerous researchers [29, 44],
although algorithmic methods are also proposed. While a countermeasure is successful on
a topology attack, a state attack would be prohibited as well. The proposed methods are
based on current graph algorithms as well as the graph of both the connected and
disconnected links. These methods allocate some instruments to illustrate the optimal
secure PMU placement in which the vertex cover would be minimized. Those devices are
installed on a group and subset of line flow and injection meters.
In [45], a greedy algorithm is proposed that simplifies secure PMU placement. These
PMUs and the algorithm are presented as an avoidance of a Data Injection Attack.
Detecting the data injection is harder in the presence of measurement noise in the
environment.
With respect to all the above mentioned attack scenarios as well as proposed solutions,
potential attacks would not be neglected. To be sure about the reliability of received
measurements and dealing with their respective consequences on state estimations, in [46],
the authors proposed a credentials scheme based on a Chi-square test. Regarding the Chisquare test, any measurement satisfying the statement below could be defined as a damaged
measurement with a certain confidence:
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Ji (xi) > 𝜒

2

m-n,0.05

where:
ith measurement is damaged,
m-n: degree of freedom while m is the number of overall states, n is the number of
redundant states,
Ji (xi) objective function defined as: eiT . Ri-1. ei
ei: the measurement error vector,
xi : the state vector to be estimated in subsystem I, and
Ri-1 : a weighted matrix which corresponds to the inverse of the error covariance
matrix.

They claimed that any changes in PMU measurements lead to significant changes in
objective function. When faced with any attack, conventional measurements would be
considered instead of the received ones. Thus, the precision of estimation and measurement
is based on a state estimation solution before the attack occurs.
In [3], message availability and integrity are introduced as the main objectives of the
WAMS network. One feature of trusted time-stamped measurements is related to the GPS
system reliability, as well as the robustness of both the PMU and PDC from a hardware
and software point of view. A non- properly functioning GPS leads to invalid real-time
data and lack of WAMS visibility.
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Moreover, authentication is considered as a part of configuration management of PMUs
in the NERC-CIP. The authors of [3] claimed that the recovery of PMU and PDC from
cyber security attacks is not yet known and considered.
To achieve availability, the whole power grid coverage of PMUs is another controversial
issue. The topic of PMU placement in power electronics has been discussed by several
researchers. Also, some researchers have investigated the placement of PMUs in the power
grid at several locations, e.g., the U.K., Korea, and India [47], [48], and [49].
Human intervention is another concern that leads to lack of integrity, incomplete
measurements, and non-proper functionality of the network. Another vulnerability is based
on different communication infrastructures implemented in WAMS networks such as
SONET, analog microwave, and VPN.
As a one-way communication protocol with push technology, the environment is much
more predictable and secure compared with SCADA. Most of the PMUs restart after any
configuration modification. Thus, any recently restarted PMU would be identified through
health monitoring tools which are designed to detect any PMU failure quickly and in nearreal time [3].
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Chapter 4. Side Channel Attack on PMUs in Smart Grid

4.1 An Overview of the Security Requirement in PMUs:
Regarding the discussions in the previous chapter, the lack of an authentication
mechanism leads to undesired injection and changes in PMU measurements which
decreases the correctness of the situational awareness of the entire power grid as the main
goal of wide area measurements. The most important security mechanism, authentication,
is vulnerable to Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) from different points of view. A brief
introduction and literature review on different types of SCAs is presented below. Since
HMAC is suggested as an authentication algorithm for PMU measurements, literature
reviews on SCAs in this chapter mostly cover the HMAC’s vulnerabilities.

4.2 Introduction to Side Channel Attacks
The physical constraints of implementing cryptographic algorithms in real-life devices
lead to new cryptanalysis concepts in security. In [50], the authors believed that these types
of attacks were more efficient than the well-known classic type of cryptanalytic primitive
attacks since experts and professional hackers have investigated and analyzed the
algorithms themselves for many years. Thus, attackers focused on the hardware and
software implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Generally, primitive attacks are
classified into classical and physical attacks. Introduced by Kocher, physical attacks refer
to the specific features of a given environment such as the processor used, which releases
the secret information of the device related to the computations of the security algorithm.
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Execution time, power consumption, and electromagnetic fields are some of the main
constraints utilized to expose the secret information of the devices. Although this is limited
to specific implementations, it is more powerful than classical ones that are only related to
the algorithm itself. In other words, there is a correlation between the physical
measurements and features taken in different intermediate points of the implemented
algorithms and the secret key related information. For instance, a variety of security
protocols include different cipher suites to ensure the correctness of the communicated data
irrespective of implementation, whether they will run on processor or custom hardware, or
whether any intermediate registers and memory will be used [51].
Physical attacks or side channel attacks are defined as having two phases: an interaction
that exploits the physical characteristics, and an exploitations phase that investigates the
measured values in the previous phase and correlates them to the secret information.
Moreover, this type of attack could be categorized as general and specific. Since they could
apply to any similar devices of similar physical principles, they are categorized as general.
However, specific practical implementations of each security algorithm categorize them as
specific.
Divide-and-conquer attacks are generally used by these types of attacks to recover the
secret key part by part. Regarding this method, the partial key, the independence of the
remaining partial key, correlated with observable physical characteristic of the leakage, are
retrieved. Next, another partial key is retrieved through the same process. Thus, a divide
and conquer attack could be iterative or non-iterative. Iterative is more vulnerable to error
in previous rounds and makes the entire key incorrect in the presence of any previous
errors.
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The exploitation phase is mostly based on two methods: a simple side channel attack and
a differential side channel attack [51]. A simple side channel attack (SSCA) is related to
the physical features of the operation itself and key-related information is released by
tracing the leakages. Since the presence of noise in practice can interrupt the SSCA results,
many statistical methods are applied by an attacker to overcome the effects of noise,
resulting in a so-called differential side channel attack (DSCA). DSCA is more practical
than SSCA and releases the secret key, or key-related information, based on processed
data. Thus, the correlation between the secret data and leakage exploited by DSCA uses a
hypothetical model as well as a statistical model to increase the efficiency. The side channel
output is calculated by a hypothetical model. Regarding the side-channel output taken from
the hypothetical model, the authors have named it a “first-order attack,” “second-order
attack,” and “higher-order attack” while one, two, or more output parameters, respectively,
are utilized for the attack.
Consequently, even a well-known cryptographic algorithm could not guarantee security.
The device carrying the algorithm has to be evaluated from a different point of SCA view
with respect to the variety of implementations.
Regarding the device environment, one type could be more practical than others. For
example, power analysis should not be a big concern of a device located in a highly secure
room, while EM analysis should. As another example, many of the sensors and actuators
in a smart grid are at the risk of a differential power analysis attack.
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4.2.1 History of Side Channel Attacks
Even though SCA is a recent term in the security discipline (circa 1998), SCAs were part
of the spy operations of the British Secret Service (MI5) close to the Egyptian embassy in
London during the Suez Crisis. They planted bugs near the cipher machines and captured
noise and clicking sounds made by them to decode the secret information. Moreover, EM
signals of cipher devices were monitored aound the French embassy in London, and the
plaintext data were detected before any encryption algorithm [54]. For many years, the
Soviet Union listened to the American consulate in Moscow through wooden seal prepared
for the U.S. Ambassador [55]. It was hung in the ambassador's office after examining it for
covert transmitters and finding it to be clean. However, the seal included a cavity that
vibrated with any sound in the room, transmitting a radio beam, and recreating sounds and
conversations.

4.2.2 General Assumptions in Side Channel Attacks
We assume that a cryptographic algorithm is applied on a secret key which is stored in
the device and hidden to the attacker. However, the attacker would know about the
cryptographic algorithm and the implemented hardware and software. Also, the attacker
has access to the device at his disposal and can run the device for several required times to
extract enough information, possibly by the optional input data. This could result in
complete control of the device, like stealing a smart card, or be hidden and monitoring the
electromagnetic fields around the target running device from a distance, or investigating
the time between the request and answer of a device. To put everything in a nutshell,
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Kerckhoffs’ well-known assumption summarized all the security information of the entire
device to the secret key, which means that the attackers have complete knowledge of the
cryptographic algorithm, implementation, etc. [50].
In the rest of this thesis, the vulnerability of timing side channel attacks over a C code
HMAC algorithm, applied to the PMU security protocol of IEC 62351, is evaluated. In the
following, after a brief description of timing, power analysis, and EM attacks, related
timing SCAs over several cryptographic algorithms, as well as other types of SCAs such
as Differential Power Analysis, are discussed.

4.3 Introducing Popular Types of SCAs
4.3.1 Timing Attack
The idea of a timing attack was first introduced and investigated by Kocher in [52] which
indicates that the execution time of a cryptographic device released the secret information
about the key. Since the device is assumed to be at the attacker’s disposal, a bunch of
messages can be processed by the target device to exploit the corresponding time. If the
attacker can provide the precise clock ticks of the device through its terminal, the precise
timing information would be obtained more easily.

Figure 4.1 Timing side channel attack.
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The overall execution time of an algorithm consists of the summations of different
running times corresponding to the steps of algorithms as random variables. The
computational time up to step S is executed based on the guessed key to be subtracted from
the total time. Thus, the exactness of measured time plays a key role in timing side channel
attacks. The observation probability would be generalized from different characterizations
whether the guessed key is correct, and would reduce the variance, or not [50]. Since
Kocher, different researchers have improved the practical timing attack on a variety of
encryption algorithms such as CASCADE smart cards [53]. Revealed by the encryption
implementation, timing information helped an attacker to break the key though a smaller
amount of guess-work. The authors of [54] believed that timing information about interkeystrokes decreased the number of guessed keys down to 1/50 on average compared with
brute force attacks.

4.3.2 Power Analysis Attack
It is clear that the power tracing of an executed algorithm is expected to reveal the secret
information in a power analysis attack. As mentioned above, power values illustrate more
information about power consumption per time unit while timing is only about the leakage
of the scalar value of time. Thus, more dimensional power information leads to a more
efficient attack, although it costs more for processing and storage. Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) have been discussed in a large
number of resources and publications [56]. DPA was first introduced by Kocher [57], who
formalized it in [58]. In general, power analysis is expected to be correlated with the
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assumed leakage model. For instance, CPA is based on the correlation between power
leakage and data Hamming weight. Thus, the accuracy and correctness of the predicted
model, model fitting, plays a significant role in effectiveness as well as the efficiency of an
attack. Therefore, the variety of statistical tests of distinguishers, with respect to the author
of [59], is demonstrated through a Difference-of-Means test, or Pearson’s correlation
coefficient or Gaussian templates. By comparing different distinguishers, the authors prove
that the results are asymptotic; however, they highly affect the attack efficiency.

4.3.3 Electromagnetic Analysis Attack (EMA)
Introduced by Quisquater and Samyde [60], EMA takes advantage of EM fields around
the crypto implementation to access the stored secret data. The core idea is based on placing
a coil around the device and analyzing the measured EM fields through Simple EMA
(SEMA) or differential EMA (DEMA). One interesting issue about EMA is its capability
of attacking from a large distance of about 15 feet without any de-packaging of the target
device, although it needs a professional EM probe to reduce the noise effect. A broader
perspective of EM leakage attacks and methodologies is presented in [61]. Since EM
leakage provides more information on cryptographic implementations, the authors claimed
that it would individually be enough to break the algorithm’s implementations, compared
with power and timing attacks. In other words, timing and power attacks exploits the one
scalar running time leakage and single-dimension power consumption per time unit,
respectively. However, four dimensional features of the device, including spatial locations
and time, are released by EM leakage. The EM side channel signal over CMOS devices is
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quantitatively modeled and applied for improving and experimentally analyzing the other
security devices such as smart cards.

4.4 Literature Review on Side Channel Attacks
4.4.1 EM and Power Analysis Attack
As mentioned above, Timing, Power and Electromagnetic analysis are three main types
of SCAs. An EM analysis attack for smart cards is designed and tested in [62]. The
implemented system calculates the EM fields radiating around the smart cards that carry
the 3DES encryption algorithm as well as estimating their capability to resist an EMA
attack. HMAC-Whirpool susceptibility to a power analysis attack, based on most common
methods named DPA and CPA, is demonstrated in [63]. In addition to timing SCA
vulnerability, RSA is susceptible to power analysis even though many countermeasures are
proposed [64]. The DES encryption algorithm is another algorithm considered against DPA
in many publications since it is implemented via a nonlinear substitution box [65]. In [66],
the authors simulated the DPA attack against the HMAC-SHA2 family through the
Hamming distance leakage model. Implementing authentication algorithms such as HMAC
involves combining a variety of algebraic functions and no look-up tables. Thus,
appropriate function-released intermediate values related to secret keys must be selected.
A group of operations such as XOR, addition modulo 2n, modular multiplication, etc. are
simulated and practically experimented against DPA in [65].
In [72], the power consumption leakage of Xilinx Spartan-3e FPGA carried MACKeccak is practically tested. For this purpose, each round of algorithm, including
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operations, and their level of vulnerability to power consumption leakage, were evaluated
in detail. Also, the optimum key length to reach the minimum leakage probability as well
as the correlation of key size to attack difficulty, defined as the ratio of the unknown bits
to an adversary to known ones, were analyzed. In other words, while a smaller length of
key is a better target of a brute force attack and a larger one consumes more energy and
cost, no maximum key length is suggested. Thus, they investigated the optimum size from
a side channel point of view, and concluded that security will not increase for every larger
key length due to more leakage and information revealed to the adversary.
The authors believed that target operations for SCA in each round must depend on both
known values to the adversary and unknown secret information. Also, linear operations
such as XOR are not a proper target of SCA. Finally, several techniques to mitigate side
channel leakage were demonstrated.

4.4.2 Timing Attack
One of the typical examples of an SCA is against smart cards. Being light weight, easy
to carry, a target for pickpockets, causing significant security issues, and easy to monitor
are some of the specific features of smart cards that lead to the simplicity of this kind of
attack. Moreover, all the information of a smart card could be explored by a simple
processor, typically, an 8-bit or 32-bit card reader. Thus, execution time, power
consumption, and EM radiations could be revealed in a straightforward manner. The card
reader supplies the battery and clock of the card, which makes the attacker able to monitor
both power and time consumption, respectively.
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Since the RSA algorithm and other public key cryptographic algorithms are working with
large values, smaller than even recent CPU word size, different mathematical and
arithmetical algorithms are utilized by crypto implementations. Even though they speed up
the encryption process, timing attack probability is increased. Using RSA with
Montgomery reduction algorithms, to increase the speed of operations, is another wellknown example of timing attack vulnerability. It is an intuitive but not optimal attack to
get the secret modular exponent d of RSA. A square and multiply algorithm is implemented
for performing modular exponentiation in order to pinpoint the weak points of the
algorithms [50].

Algorithm: Square and Multiply [50]
1. x = m
2. for i = w-2 down to 0 do
3.
x=x2 mod n
4.
if di == 1 then
5.
x = x.m mod n
6.
end if
7. end for
8. Return x

Depending on different inputs, any intermediate results bigger than the modulus lead to an
extra subtraction which increases the consumption time. Thus, whether any final reduction
is required or not, two sets of execution time named as “long ones” and “short ones” are
provided. Next, the first unknown bit is assumed as 1, which requires the multiplication by
m in line 5 of the algorithm above. It could be either long or short based on the m value.
Since no secret information is required in this step, many messages are evaluated in an
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iterative process and grouped in one of two sets. The "long ones" set is expected to be
executed in a longer period of time than the "short ones." The remaining bits are considered
as noise since they depend on secret information and cannot be simulated. All the above
results are based on the first assumption of the first bit equal to 1. Consequently, the
execution time of two sets of long and short would not result in significant differences and
would be roughly random if the assumption was not correct. After determining the first bit,
the same processes are continued for all remaining bits.
As one of the first published resources in this area, timing attacks on Diffie-Hellman,
DSS, and other system implementations are introduced in [67]. Although a timing attack
against Diffie-Hellman cryptographic schemes is categorized as one of the first ones, dating
back to the 1990s, it was experimentally investigated in 2005 by the authors of [68].
Moreover, a variety of conditional statements, branches and loops can apply for
implementing and coding a single algorithm, which leads to extensive differences in
running time of the same algorithm. Even in a single implementation, the running time of
an algorithm reveals information for an attacker while these statements are based on secret
information.
Breaking the stored key in an Xbox 360 CPU through a timing attack for a forging
authenticator is another practical example of SCAs. It shows that timing attacks are not
only constrained network-based attacks to the SSL library, but that software developers as
well as embedded system designers have to consider the effects of SCAs. Any other datadependent behaviors such as cache processing increase the probability of SCA attacks with
higher precision measurements [55]. A cache timing attack against AES encryption
algorithms was comprehensively investigated in [69]. The reason is that many look-up
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tables stored in cache are utilized for implementing and speeding up the AES algorithm.
However, variable computation time occurs because all tables do not fit into the cache.
Whether the requested data is available in cache or not, cache hits and misses would occur,
leading to different running times. Even though NIST declared that look-up tables are not
susceptible to timing attacks, recent researchers indicated the capability of timing attacks
against some AES implementations [70]. However, eliminating look-up tables would not
reduce side channel attacks from a power and EM radiation point of view. Another group
of algorithms such as hash functions do not make use of look-up tables for implementation.
In contrast, addition modulo, bitwise XOR, and shift and rotation denoted by ARX
(Addition-Rotation-XOR) are used. The author claimed that those are harder to remain
secure against side channel attacks, while applying a limited choice of bitwise Boolean
operations, and (cyclic) shifts could be more efficient under some conditions. More details
on their assumptions and outcomes are discussed in [69].
Regarding the importance of SCA, different candidates of the NIST SHA-3 hash function
competition are asked for efficient operations against SCA in [71] and [72].
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timing attacks are also experimented with in [73] to break the 1024-bit RSA in only two
hours.
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4.5 Countermeasures of Side Channel Attacks
A great many solutions against different types of SCAs are demonstrated, mostly at the
algorithm level, although none of them can guarantee complete security even for a single
attack. In other words, resistance against all type of SCAs through one implementation is
tremendously challenging. Since accessing the secret information is the goal of attackers
in SCAs, frequently refreshing a key would reduce the success probability of EM and
power analysis attacks, although it does not appear to be a helpful method for timing. In
general, countermeasures are categorized into both hardware and software levels. Noise
addition, extra shields, removable power supplies, encrypting bus and memory, and
randomizing the interrupt processes or clock cycle are some of the suggested hardware
countermeasures against a variety of SCAs. Masking, or hiding, the leakage is one of the
well-known techniques for making different SCAs unpredictable. Avoiding the attacker to
read the intermediate values, blinding is another widely used approach introduced by
Kocher [50]. In other words, blinding is referred to as randomly mixing the input data of a
crypto algorithm as well as applying the correlated operation to the algorithm’s output with
the goal of retrieving the correct and expected results. Thus, the attacker would not learn
about processing data and its intermediate operation leakage. Also, using nonce in blinding
and masking can highly disrupt the correlation of leakage to the adversary. Even though it
could prevent an SCA, e.g., timing at a high level, designing the correct correlated
operation to reveal the expected result is hard, especially for symmetric cipher algorithms.
A more comprehensive list of solutions against SCAs is presented in [74]. Thus,
protecting against SCAs imposes extra cost and overhead which must be considered in
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countermeasures. In [75], the authors discussed some optimization techniques to decrease
the occupied memory in order to minimize the masking overhead related to utilized
memory. Several masking methods against DPA are also discussed in [84] in a variety of
arithmetical and Boolean operations utilized for implementing AES, SEED, SHA1, etc.
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Chapter 5. Investigating the
Timing Side Channel Attacks against PMU Authentication

For the IEC 62351 security algorithm discussed in the previous chapter, HMAC-SHA1
is a suggested authentication algorithm for signing the measured values by PMUs. In this
thesis, the vulnerability of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication algorithm against a timing
SCA is investigated. Prior to any further discussions, a brief introduction of the HMACSHA1 algorithm is presented.

5.1 Overview of HMAC–SHA1 Algorithm
With respect to NIST documents, FIPS PUB 198 [77] and FIPS PUB 180-4 [78], message
M and a key K with any desired length, key length mostly larger than the message digest,
are used as the two inputs of the HMAC algorithm, which is defined as:
HMAC (M, K) = H ((K+⊕opad) || H ((K+⊕ipad) ||M))
Where:
ipad: 00110110 (36 in hexadecimal) repeated (block size)/8 times
opad: 01011100 (5C in hexadecimal) repeated (block size)/8 times
K+ : K padded with zero on left to reach b bits in length of block size
⊕: Bitwise exclusive OR
(K⊕ipad) and (K⊕opad) are key variant values prepending to the message and the
previous output of the hash value, respectively. The hash function of the above equation
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might be any SHA1, SHA3, SHA256, SHA512, etc. HMAC-SHA1 is assumed in the
following as a suggested authenticator of PMU’s measurement transmitted to the PDC via
IEC 61850.
Since a variety of lengths of message M is acceptable as an input of HMAC-SHA1 and
the message has to be divided into an integer number of the same block size, the message
is padded by one bit of 1 followed by the required number of zeroes to complete a block
size, or 512 bits in HMAC-SHA1. In addition, an extra 64 bits is padded at the end of the
message, indicating the initial message length. Figure 5.1 illustrates the HMAC-SHA1
algorithm:

Figure 5.1 HMAC-SHA1 overview.
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Where:
Wt = {

Mt
0 ≤ t ≤ 15
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As shown in the figure, the first block is the only key-dependent value, which can be
calculated and stored in a register once updating the key. It speeds up processing and
delivering the real-time measurement of PMUs since it is not required to calculate hashing
of K+⊕ipad of each measured value separately. In the same way, K+⊕opad is also precomputed by the processor and registered. Then, each block of messages is inserted into a
hash function as illustrated.
In addition, there is a tradeoff between frequently updating the supplied key and SCA
vulnerability. In particular, it leads to revealing more leakages because K+⊕ipad and
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K+⊕opad must be pre-computed and registered to speed up process. However, more
frequently updating key cause to more leakage to reveal for attacker.

5.2 Previous Work on Timing Attacks against HMAC-SHA1
To the best of our knowledge, previously discussed timing attacks on the HMAC
algorithm are limited to comparisons of digest data. In other words, without any knowledge
of the utilized key for signing a measured value, an attacker can find the correct signature
of the desired plaintext by evaluating the consumed time to compare the received signature
by an attacker and the expected one in the receiver side and not the execution time in the
sender. Regarding byte wise comparison in high level language, the comparison loop
should be terminated early if any element is not matched. In contrast, the comparison loop
should continue while all bytes of received signature and expected ones in the receiver are
the same. It leads to leakage of time when the attacker is resubmitting large numbers of
guessed digests iteratively and monitoring executed time. Thus, an attacker can get the
expected signature of a desired fault value by comparing the execution time of each
individually guessed byte of signature, assuming the remaining to be zero, without any
knowledge of the secret key. The predicted byte is assumed as an expected one if longer
time is consumed by the processor.
Although secret key information is not required in performing this type of timing side
channel attack, the entire attack process is required for each individual fault data that is
willing to be inserted into the recipient by the attacker.
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Obviously, this type of attack could be simply spoiled. For instance, a comparison
function should not end in occurrence of any dissimilarity. Also, the XOR function could
be applied over the received signature and the expected ones. Thus, the received signature
is correct if the XOR output is equal to zero.

5.3 The Analysis of Timing Attacks on HMAC-SHA1
Regarding the above mentioned drawback, our contribution is targeted to the HMACSHA1 algorithm itself, with the goal of retrieving some information about the stored key
length and Hamming weight. The number of bits turned one in data is defined as the data
Hamming weight, while the Hamming distance is the difference of Hamming weight
between two codes that are calculated by the XOR of both codes. Data leakage can be
observed in SCAs by the number of bits turned to one.

5.3.1 Attack Description
This thesis examines the weakness of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication crypto
implementation algorithm from a leakage of execution time viewpoint. The attack includes
two phases, named the interaction and exploitation phases, which are explained below.


Interaction Phase: In this phase, the physical feature, i.e., execution time of the
algorithm, is exploited. For this, 48 samples including 48 different numbers of
values, as input measurements, and 48 different keys are assumed. In other words,
each sample has a different Data Length (DataL), Data Hamming Weight
(DataHW), Key Length (KeyL), and Key Hamming Weight (KeyHW). Therefore,
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the signature of each sample could have different Hamming Weight values as well,
called DigestHW. Since the encryption algorithm is not considered in IEC 62351,
the attacker can simply access each pair of samples and corresponding execution
times. Next, these 48 samples are applied to the algorithm and corresponding
execution times are measured.


Exploitation Phase: In this phase, the correlation of results obtained in the
interaction phase with secret information is investigated. Introduced in the previous
chapter, DSCA is utilized here. Thus, statistical methods are applied to the previous
results to demonstrate the correlation between secret data and leakage. For this, two
different models of regression, named as Negative Binomial Regression (nbreg)
and Linear Regression, are run using IBM SPSS Statistics. Particularly, linear
regression models the execution time versus five predictors of DataL, DataHW,
KeyL, (KeyHW), and DigestHW, while nbreg models KeyL (or KeyHW) versus
other sets of predictors named as execution time (Time), DataL, DataHW, and
DigestHW. The reason is that linear regression constraints the output (Time) to be
a continuous variable while nbreg does not have such limitation. Moreover, an
optimum number of predictors in each model is indicated with the help of
backward-stepwise regression. The goal is to estimate the length and Hamming
weight of the utilized key in the target device. After fitting these 48 samples on
regression models, called training data, another 48 samples are applied to the
obtained model, called test data, to investigate the model exactness and accuracy.
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5.3.2 Assumptions
 The attacker is able to measure the execution time of algorithm for each desired
plaintext. It is the first assumption considered in the first paper in introducing SCA
by Kocher [50].

 Execution time is reproducible. In other words, fixed time is assumed for fixed data.
 The attacker has access to the PMU measurement since the encryption algorithm is
not considered in all above-mentioned communication standards and security
protocols.

 The signature is appended to the measurement data and sent from the PMU
substation to PDC through the IEC 61850 communication protocol. Since no
encryption algorithm is considered, the attacker can access the corresponding
signature, Si, of each desired measurement, Mi. Thus, each pair of (Mi, Si) is
accessible by the attacker.

 The attacker has access to the target PMU installed in the PMU substation at his
disposal.

 The attacker has full knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm, implemented
hardware and software, etc. The secret key is the only hidden information to the
attacker.

 The written C code of the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm, released in rfc4634 [76], is
used and SCA’s vulnerability is investigated.

 Nanoseconds-level precision of running time is examined over the Linux PC
Operating System, Intel ® Core™2 CPU, 6700 @ 2.66GHz, 2.00 GB RAM.
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 MATLAB and IBM SPSS Statistics are used for analyzing results and generating
graphs.

5.3.3 Selecting the Most Precise Execution Time
Regarding many sources of variance in timing data, several methods have to be
considered in preciseness of measured execution time of the implemented crypto algorithm
in a given processor. For instance, cache hits and misses, pipelining, branch prediction,
register overwriting, counter overflow, out-of-order execution, and many invisible and
optimization tasks in programs and compilers lead to significant differences in cycle count
and measured execution time of a given cryptographic algorithm such as HMAC [43].
Several solutions such as minimum execution time and average time are suggested against
cache effect to go over these system events that affect the cycle count. In this thesis, we
consider both iteration and minimum time solutions. All times have been measured after
100 iterations of execution and the minimum time is considered as final. However, these
results are compared with the execution time measured from ‘first observed time after
booting up the PC’ as well as ‘average execution time of 100 iterations’. Therefore, the
most precise execution time leading to better regression model fitting is investigated in the
following by assuming three types of execution time corresponding to each sample: first
observed time (after booting up the PC), average time of 100 iterations, and minimum
execution time of 100 iterations.
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In this step, we only model the execution time versus DataL and KeyL through linear
regression models based on the least square method. The reason for considering only these
two predictors will be shown in Section 5.3.4 Optimum Number of Predictors.

I.

Average Time

Table 5.1 Model summary based on average time of 100 iterations. Predictors: (Constant),
KeyL, DataL; Dependent Variable: Avg. Time
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

1

.795a

.632

.616

21.84841

Adjusted R Square is defined as square of the correlation between the observed
(executed time here) and the estimated modeled data values. Regarding this definition,
the higher value of adjusted R square, closer to 1, is more acceptable and signifies a
better model.

Table 5.2 Coefficient summary based on average time of 100 iterations; Dependent Variable:
Average Time
Model

(Constant)
DataL
KeyL

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
-10.839
7.074
.858
.103
-.017
.097

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.800
-.016

t

Sig.

-1.532
8.308
-.171

.132
.000
.865
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Figure 5.2 Equivalent model based on average time.

Considering the average execution time of over 100 iterations, Figure 5.2 indicates the
observed execution time versus the estimated ones through linear regression analysis of
least square methods. As can be seen, the final model summary, Table 5.1, does not indicate
the acceptable adjustable R square. Also, estimated time is not suitably tracing the executed
ones in Figure 5.2 (i.e., a scatter plot of estimated time versus the executed time).
Corresponding Coefficients of DataL and KeyL, as independent variables considered in
linear regression model, is shown in column B of Table 5.2.
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II.

First Observed Time

Table 5.3 Model summary based on first observed time. Predictors: (Constant), KeyL, DataL;
Dependent Variable: FirstTime
Model

R

R Square

1

.922a

.850

Adjusted R
Square
.844

Std. Error of the Estimate
.46796

Table 5.4 Coefficient summary based on first observed time. Dependent Variable: First
Observed Time
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

(Constant)

B
.810

Std. Error
.152

5.348

.000

DataL

.028

.002

.779

12.678

.000

KeyL

.010

.002

.293

4.763

.000

Figure 5.3 Equivalent model based on first observed time.
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By comparing the results with the prior results of average execution time, this model
represents a more acceptable equivalent model. In other words, the adjustable R square
increased from 0.616 of the first model based on average time, shown in Table 5.1, to 0.844
of the second model based on the first observed time, shown in Table 5.3. Also, both
predictors are significant. The Sig. column in Table 5.4 is zero for both predictors, which
means it is a better model.
In comparison with Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 shows more tracing of expected time with the
estimated model in most of the samples; however, of 48 samples, 7 are modeled extremely
differently compared with the observed ones. To overcome this problem, a third model is
evaluated based on the minimum execution time observed over 100 runs.

III. Minimum Time of 100 runs

Table 5.5 Model summary based on minimum time of 100 iterations. Predictors: (Constant),
KeyL, DataL
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

1

.991a

.982

.982

.09296

85

Table 5.6 Coefficient summary
Dependent Variable: Minimum Time.
Model

based

Unstandardized
Coefficients

on

minimum

Standardized
Coefficients

time

of

100

iterations.

t

Sig.

33.444

.000

B

Std. Error

Beta

(Constant)

1.007

.030

DataL

.018

.000

.877

41.652

.000

KeyL

.005

.000

.250

11.861

.000

Table 5.5 clearly shows a significant increase in adjustable R square value from 0.844
based on the first observed time, shown in Table 5.3, to 0.982 based on the minimum
execution time over 100 iterations.
Table 5.6 shows that both predictors are significant since the Sig. column is zero for both
predictors. Finally, Figure 5.4 shows the best equivalent model, tracing executed time by
estimated ones, in comparison with the previous two models. Therefore, in the rest of this
thesis, a minimum execution time of 100 iterations is considered as a reference for
computing regression models.
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Figure 5.4 Equivalent model based on minimum execution time.

5.3.4 Optimum Number of Predictors
In all the previous tables and figures, only two predictors, DataL and KeyL, are
considered. The reason is discussed below. Particularly, the optimum number of predictors
is investigated since more predictors cause an attacker to prepare more information and
consume more resources. Thus, a fewer number of predictors are more desirable.
Stepwise regression in statistics leads to the choice of predictor variables in an automatic
procedure. It is included in several approaches, in which two main approaches are forward
selection, i.e., starting without any variables and comparing the model criterions by
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addition of each individual predictor gradually as one step, and backward selection, which
includes all the variables and compares the model criteria by deleting each predictor
variable gradually. The latter one is utilized in this thesis. Thus, all the predictors are first
involved in estimating execution time. Then, by analyzing and comparing the significance
of coefficients (Sig. column of coefficient summary tables), adjusted R square, etc., the
least significant predictor is chosen and deleted from the list of predictors. The process is
continued with the goal of obtaining an efficient model and predictors. Also, the interaction
of predictors is calculated and applied as new predictors.
Since an attacker explores the values of KeyL and KeyHW in a target device
independently, estimating the execution time relying on KeyL and KeyHW is investigated
in separate scenarios in the following sections.

I.

Estimating Execution Time vs. Key Length (Linear Regression)

Table 5.7 Model summary including all predictors (considering KeyL). Predictors: (Constant),
DigestHW*KeyL, DigestHW, DataHW, DataL, DataHW*KeyL, DataL*DataHW, KeyL*DataL,
KeyL, DataL*DigestHW, DataHW*DigestHW

Table 5.8 Coefficient summary including all
Dependent Variable: Minimum Time of 100 iterations
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients

predictors

(considering

Standardized
Coefficients
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KeyL).

t

Sig.

2.979

.005

Beta

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

1.303

.437

KeyL

.005

.006

.272

.911

.368

DataL

.004

.009

.197

.478

.635

DigestHW

-.003

.005

-.030

-.535

.596

DataHW

.003

.002

.775

1.805

.079

KeyLByDataL

1.352E-005

.000

.066

.795

.431

DataLByDataHW

-2.003E-006

.000

-.055

-.541

.592

DataLByDigestHW

.000

.000

.732

1.664

.105

DataHWByDigstHW -4.138E-005

.000

-.854

-1.778

.084

DataHWByKeyL

4.391E-006

.000

.081

1.152

.257

DigestHWByKeyL

-2.795E-005

.000

-.114

-.368

.715

As shown in Table 5.8, all of the interaction predictors and some of the simple predictors
(non-interaction ones) are not significant. Particularly, predictors are called significant while
the Sig. value in coefficient summary table is less than or equal to 0.05. In addition, the
adjusted R square of Table 5.7 is less than the same value in Table 5.5. Thus, this model is
not efficient. The next deleting predictor of the backward selection procedure is the one with
the biggest Sig. value, 0.715, i.e., interaction of DigestHW and KeyL, DigestHWByKeyL.
By deleting the predictor carrying the greatest Sig. value, and comparing the adjusted R
square value as Sig. of the remaining, the most efficient models are those shown in Table 5.5,
Table 5.6, and scatter plot of estimated time versus executed time ,shown in Figure 5.5 .
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Figure 5.5 Equivalent model based on minimum time vs data length and key length

As it is shown in Figure 5.5, key length and data length, as the optimum predictors, are
highly correlated with execution time of algorithm. In addition, Figure 5.6 shows the
equivalent model of real execution time of algorithm versus estimated time over the new
samples of training and testing data when the key length is fixed to 35 bytes.
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Figure 5.6 Equivalent model of execution time vs fixed key length and variable data length

Similar to the equivalent model of Figure 5.6, an attacker should create a set of equivalent
models by calculating the execution time of algorithm for a set of fixed-length keys and
variable length of data. Since both the execution time and data length are accessible by the
attacker, supplied key length could be predicted. In other words, by comparing the real
executed time and data length with the estimated time of different equivalent models,
which is correspond to each fixed-length key, the length of utilized key of the target device
is estimated.
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II.

Estimating Execution Time vs. Key Hamming Weight (Linear Regression)

The goal of the above model fitting is to predict the stored key length by considering the
execution time of the algorithm. In the same way, correlation of KeyHW with execution
time of the algorithm will be investigated in the following section. Considering all
predictors and interactions, the adjusted R square and coefficients are shown in Table 5.9
and Table 5.10, respectively.
Table 5.9 Model summary including all predictors (considering KeyHW). Predictors:
(Constant), DigestHW*KeyHW, DigestHW, DataL, DataHW, DataHW*KeyHW,
KeyHW*DataL, DataL*DataHW, DataL*DigestHW, KeyHW, DataHW*DigestHW
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

1

.984a

.969

.960

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.13643

Table 5.10 Coefficient summary including all predictors (considering KeyHW).
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

2.044

.048

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

1.297

.635

DataL

.009

.011

.429

.808

.424

DataHW

.003

.002

.673

1.167

.251

DigestHW

-.002

.008

-.022

-.267

.791

KeyHW

.000

.002

.070

.149

.883

KeyHWByDataL

9.656E-006

.000

.191

1.655

.106

DataHWByKeyHW

-3.925E-007

.000

-.033

-.313

.756

DataLByDataHW

-1.277E-006

.000

-.035

-.238

.813

DataLByDigestHW

.000

.000

.543

.958

.344

DataHWByDigstHW

-3.784E-005

.000

-.781

-1.257

.217

DigestHWByKeyHW -2.807E-007

.000

-.005

-.011

.991

Beta
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Similar to Table 5.8, most predictors in Table 5.10 are not significant. In the same way
as deleting predictors by greater Sig. value, most efficient models are discussed in the
following. Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 show the best model summary from an adjusted R
square viewpoint and the best coefficient summary from a Sig. viewpoint, respectively.

Table 5.11 Model summary of best adjusted R square (considering KeyHW). Predictors:
(Constant), KeyHW, DataHW, DataL
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.982a

.964

.962

.13380

Table 5.12 Coefficient summary of best adjusted R square (considering KeyHW).
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

24.486

.000

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

1.048

.043

DataL

.021

.001

1.018

22.407

.000

DataHW

.000

.000

-.116

-2.569

.014

KeyHW

.001

.000

.184

6.327

.000

Beta

As shown above, the best adjustable R square model is based on DataL, DataHW, and
KeyHW. Thus, as considered in our assumption, an attacker needs full knowledge of the
measured values by PMUs, DataL and DataHW, inserted as input values to the
authentication algorithm (HMAC-SHA1). However, if the encryption algorithm is
considered in the security protocol of IEC 62351, the efficient model would be as shown
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in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14. Table 5.13 shows that the adjusted R square value is
decreased to 0.957 compared with Table 5.11, which carries a value of 0.962. However, all
predictors are significant in Table 5.14.

Table 5.13 Model summary without knowledge of DataHW (considering KeyHW). Predictors:
(Constant), KeyHW, DataL
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.979a

.959

.957

.14188

Table 5.14 Coefficient summary without knowledge of DataHW (considering KeyHW).
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

23.381

.000

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

1.057

.045

DataL

.019

.001

.928

30.177

.000

KeyHW

.001

.000

.181

5.891

.000

Beta

94

Figure 5.7 Equivalent models with/without considering DataHW (considering KeyHW).

The scatter plot of the equivalent model is the best method to compare the most
significant variables which predict the independent one. Regarding Figure 5.7, DataHW
could be excluded for modeling the execution time, considering KeyHW and DataL, which
is shown in Figure 5.8. Accuracy of the model is evaluated by a new set of data, called test
data, illustrated in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8 Equivalent model for execution time vs. data length and key Hamming weight.

According to Figures 5.5 and 5.8, there is a correlation between the execution time of the
HMAC-SHA1 authentication algorithm and secret related information as KeyL and
KeyHW, respectively. In particular, since the encryption algorithm is not included in the
communication protocol of a PMU substation, an attacker has full knowledge of DataL,
which simplifies the attack to estimate the KeyHW and KeyL. Thus, the cryptanalysis
process of an attacker would be narrowed down to a limited number of possibilities.
Similar to the previous section of estimating key length of target device, Figure 5.9 shows
the equivalent model of real execution time of algorithm versus estimated time over the
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new samples of training and testing data when the key Hamming weight is fixed to 78
bytes.

Figure 5.9 Equivalent model of execution time vs fixed key HW and variable data length

An attacker needs to create a set of equivalent models, similar to Figure 5.9, by
calculating the execution time of algorithm for a set of fixed length of key Hamming weight
and variable length of data.
Obviously, an attacker needs an extra attempt to predict the key length and key Hamming
weight while the linear regression is utilized. In other words, linear regression is able to
predict the execution time of algorithm while secret-related information, e.g. key length
and key Hamming weight, are the goal of attacker. Thus, an attacker should estimate those
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desired information based on the equivalent models, e.g. Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.9 for a
set of fixed key length and key Hamming weight, and compares them by the observed
execution time of algorithm. To overcome this shortcoming, next section investigates
another type of regression which is called negative binomial regression.

5.3.5 Negative Binomial with Log Link Regression Model
In addition to the above mentioned analysis, the Negative Binomial with Log Link
Regression (nbreg) based on minimum execution time will be discussed below. The reason
for nbreg utilization, as another modeling of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication algorithm,
is to model separately the Hamming weight and length of stored key based on execution
time, with DataL, DataHW, and DigestHW as predictors, instead of modeling the execution
time based on keyL and KeyHW. It simplifies the attacker cryptanalysis process by
revealing the information about KeyL and KeyHW as the output of nbreg regression, called
the dependent variable. Also, we cannot use the same linear regression model and consider
KeyL or KeyHW dependent variables because they are not continuous values, which
causes linear regression to not perform properly. On the contrary, nbreg is suitable for
count data. Moreover, negative binomial distribution is more general than the Poisson.
In the following, KeyL and KeyHW are modeled separately as dependent variables
through nbreg regression.
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I.

Estimating Key Length vs. Execution Time (nbreg)

Table 5.15 Omnibus test via nbreg including all predictors (considering KeyL). Predictors:
(Intercept), DataL, DataHW, Time, DigestHW, DataL*DataHW, DataL*Time, DataL*DigestHW,
DataHW*Time, DataHW*DigestHW, Time*DigestHW. Dependent variable: KeyL
Likelihood
Ratio ChiSquare

df

Sig.

8.477

10

.582

Table 5.15 shows the significance of the model for estimating the KeyL while including
all possible predictors and interactions, as listed in the table. As shown in Table 5.15, the
model is not significant. Sig. is significantly greater than 0.05, due to including so many
predictors. However, the equivalent model, illustrated in Figure 5.10, indicates a
reasonable and admirable tracing of expected KeyL values compared with the predicted
ones.
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Figure 5.10 Equivalent model via nbreg including all predictors (comparing the expected KeyL
vs predicted values of mean response over 100 estimations and confidence interval of 0.95).

Obviously, an attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of measurement values and
signatures indicated as DataHW and DigestHW. In the following, the model fitting by
considering the encryption algorithm is indicated. In other words, DataHW and DigestHW
are assumed to be concealed from the attacker.
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Table 5.16 Omnibus test via nbreg and including encryption algorithm (considering KeyL).
Predictors: (Intercept), DataL, Time, DataL * Time; Dependent Variable: KeyL
Likelihood
Ratio ChiSquare

df

Sig.

8.078

3

.044

Although the numbers of predictors are significantly decreased, which leads to better Sig.
values in Table 5.16, Figure 5.11 does not present a desirable tracing of expected KeyL by
estimated ones compared with Figure 5.10.

Figure 5.11 Equivalent model via nbreg including the encryption algorithm (compared
expected KeyL vs predicted values of mean response over 100 estimations, confidence interval
of 0.95).
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II.

Estimating Key Hamming Weight vs. Execution Time (nbreg)

The same scenario is applied to model the KeyHW by nberg with and without including
the encryption algorithm, which conceals the information of DataL and DigestHW.

Table 5.17 Omnibus test via nbreg including all predictors (considering KeyHW). Predictors:
(Intercept), DigestHW, DataL, DataHW, Time, DigestHW*DataL, DigestHW*DataHW,
DigestHW*Time, DataL*DataHW, DataL*Time, DataHW*Time, Dependent value: KeyHW
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square

df

Sig.

34.906

10

.000

Table 5.17 shows a significant model (Sig. is equal to zero) although it includes many
predictors. Thus, as expected, a reasonable tracing of expected KeyHW values compared
with estimated ones by nbreg is illustrated in Figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.12 Equivalent model via nbreg including all predictors (comparing expected KeyHW
vs predicted values of mean responses over 100 estimations and confidence interval of 0.95).

Next, by considering the encryption algorithm, a new equivalent model based on nbreg
is shown in Table 5.18. Similarly, the model is significant; Sig. is zero. However, the
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square is reduced in comparison with Table 5.17.

Table 5.18 Omnibus test via nbreg and including encryption algorithm (considering KeyHW).
Predictors: (Intercept), DataL, Time, DataL * Time; Dependent Variable: KeyHW
Likelihood
Ratio ChiSquare

df

Sig.

33.626

3

.000
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As expected, by reducing the number of predictors in nbreg model fitting, the accuracy
of tracing the predicted KeyHW value compared with expected ones is decreased even
though it is somehow acceptable. The equivalent model is shown in Figure 5.13.

Figure 5.13 Equivalent model via nbreg including the encryption algorithm (compared
expected KeyHW vs predicted values of mean response over 100 estimations; confidence
interval 0.95).
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Chapter 6. Conclusions

In this thesis, the security of PMUs in the smart grid communication infrastructure is
analyzed. After the introduction, PMUs are introduced from a communications
infrastructure viewpoint. In this regard, several synchrophasor, communication, and
security standards, considered and implemented in transmitting the real-time PMU
measurements to PDCs, are discussed. PDCs are interpreted and correlated to the received
data as a time-stamped data stream to demonstrate a time-dependent snapshot of the entire
smart grid. However, PMU to PDC communication is vulnerable to a variety of attacks.
Previously discussed attacks demonstrate several vulnerabilities, constraints, and issues
that must be considered in communication infrastructures of PMUs. For instance,
delivering the real-time streaming phasor data of PMUs to the PDC is one of the main
limitations which leads to eliminating the encryption algorithm in IEC 62351, as the
security protocol of PMU substation communication. On the other hand, the importance of
authenticity and integrity of PMU measurement values, received by PDCs, leads to
deploying a lightweight HAMC-SHA1 authentication algorithm. First investigated in this
thesis, HMAC-SHA1 is vulnerable to timing SCAs. In other words, an attacker can obtain
the secret-related information about the supplied key HMAC by monitoring the execution
time of the algorithm. In this thesis, linear regression and negative binomial regression are
applied to model the correlation of the stored-key length and the stored-key Hamming
weight with the execution time of the algorithm. All analyses are based on a variety of
predictors, such as data length, data Hamming weight (HW), and HMAC digest HW, with
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the goal of predicting the length and HW of the utilized key. Since the HMAC-SHA1 can
take any key length larger than zero (mostly more than 20 bytes or 160 bits), results can
help an attacker to narrow down a brute force attack to a smaller number of keys with the
knowledge of key lengths and number of bits, which are one and zero. In addition, even
though the encryption algorithm is not considered in current released security standards of
PMU communications, the analysis presented here considered the encryption algorithm as
well.
HMAC-SHA1 is highly vulnerable to timing SCAs from a key length and Hamming
weight viewpoint. In this thesis, the correlation of stored-key length and Hamming weight
with the execution time of HMAC-SHA1, as the authentication algorithm recommended
in IEC 62351, is modeled and investigated. To achieve this, the execution time of algorithm
is considered as the main variable in all analysis. With accuracy in the order of
nanoseconds, measured execution time can be affected by many parameters, such as cache
functionality and parallel processing. Results show that minimum execution time over 100
iterations presents the best model fitting compared with first observed time and average
time over 100 measurements.
A linear regression model (with least square method) indicated that data length, key
length, and key Hamming weight have more significance in predicting the execution time
of the algorithm compared with both the Hamming weight of the data and HMAC digest.
Therefore, including the encryption algorithm, concealing the pair of data and
corresponding digest (Mi, Si) would not be a countermeasure to timing SCAs against
HMAC. Although it indicates the proper equivalent models whether encryption algorithm
is considered or not, an attacker needs an extra attempt to estimate the desire information
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of target device, e.g. key length and key Hamming weight. In particular, a set of equivalent
models must be created by calculating the execution time of algorithm for a set of fixed
key length and fixed key Hamming weight over variable data length. Thus, attacker could
estimate the desire information based on calculated equivalent model and compared them
with the observed execution time of algorithm. To overcome this shortcoming, negative
binomial regression is investigated.
Negative binomial regression with log link regression (nbreg) is applied to model the key
length and key HW as count data. Generally, nbreg is more feasible to apply by an attacker
since target values are released directly from the output. However, the preciseness of the
estimated model is reduced in the presence of an encryption algorithm, by concealing the
data and corresponding signature, compared with the equivalent linear regression model.
By the way, it reveals a highly proper model for estimating the key length and HW by
considering the currently released security and communication standards.
As countermeasures, random delay or similar approaches could not be applied to PMU
data due to their real time applications. However, randomizing the packet length could
mitigate the success of an attacker since data length is highly correlated with the execution
time in linear regression, and both are applied as the predictors to estimate the length and
Hamming weight of the secret key. In addition, since the substations are not assumed to be
secure in the power grid, some compensation methods for the physical security of
substations, e.g., surveillance cameras, should be the simplest countermeasures to SCAs
for authenticated data of PMUs.
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Chapter 7. Future Work

Through this thesis, the correlation of execution time of algorithm with length and
Hamming weight of the supplied key to the HAMC-SHA1 authentication algorithm is
investigated. Thus, an attacker can estimate the length and the number of zeroes and ones
in the stored key of a target device. However, this does not indicate the absolute value of
the key which could be considered as future work. Particularly, a divide-and-conquer attack
must target the intermediate values of an algorithm to recover the key part-by-part. For
each predicted key length and Hamming weight, all pairs of key possibilities and
corresponding execution times must be measured. Also, the intermediate operations of
HMAC from a timing SCA viewpoint must be analyzed. In brief, those operations must be
dependent to both the unknown values, i.e. the secret key, and some known values to the
attacker.
Then, the correlation coefficients of stored key with the estimated ones must be
calculated to figure out how the estimated value differs from the real supplied key.
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